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FREEDOM, TRUTH, AND LAW IN THE MIND AND
HOMELAND OF JOHN PAUL II
GERALD J. BEYER, PH.D.*
INTRODUCTION
The tension between avoiding the moral vacuum of relativ-
ism and respect for the freedom and rights of the individual in a
democratic order has been the subject of great controversy in
Poland since 1989. Issues such as abortion legislation and
mandatory religious education in public schools provided an
impetus for this debate. The late Pope John Paul II stirred con-
troversy on numerous occasions by expressing his views on this
matter. During his pilgrimages to his homeland, Pope John Paul
II repeated pronouncements concerning "true" freedom, which
is always "freedom in the service of truth." The Pope's denuncia-
tion of "false freedom" caused dismay among many defenders of
liberal democracy, perhaps reminding them of the Roman Cath-
olic Church's pre-Vatican II insistence that "error has no rights."
Some of Poland's most prominent intellectuals, such as Adam
Michnik, Leszek Kolakowski, and Czeslaw Milosz, worried that
the Roman Catholic Church wanted the government to "legislate
morality." Some even surmised that the Roman Catholic Church
sought to create a "theocracy."'
* Assistant Professor of Theology, Saint Joseph's University. A version of
this essay was presented at the Oxford Round Table on Religion, Education,
and the Role of Government, Oxford University on July 31, 2006. Many thanks
are due to the participants who made a number of helpful comments and stim-
ulated further thought on the concerns of this essay.
1. See, e.g., Leszek Kolakowski, "Krotka Rozprawa o Teokracji" and Czes-
law Milosz, "Panstwo Wyznaniowe?" in SPOR 0 POLSKE (Pawel Spiewak, ed.,
2001). See ADAM MICHNIK, LETTERS FROM FREEDOM: POST-COLD WAR REALITIES
AND PERSPECTVES 178-83, 286-305 (Irena Grudzifiska Gross ed., Jane Cave
trans., 1998) [hereinafter LETTERS FROM FREEDOM]. For helpful discussions of
both sides of this debate, see JAROSLAw GOWIN, KoscIOL W CZASACH WOLNOSCI
1989-1999, 106-12 (1999) and JOZEF TISCHNER, NIESZCZESNY DAR WOLNOSCI
130-41 (1996). For general discussions of the role of the Roman Catholic
church in Polish politics after 1989 in English, see Sabrina P. Ramet, Thy Will be
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Proponents of liberal democracy feared that the Church
demanded all of its moral teaching be enshrined in law, thus
blurring the distinction between moral norms and civil law. In
response to this putative demand, political liberals have claimed
that "freedom grants equal rights to sinners and the virtuous, to
wisdom and idiocy, truth and chicanery, love and hate," as
Michnik put it.2 Michnik and others argued that the Church
must accept this tenet of liberal democracy. However, many of
these same critics of the Church also contended it must chal-
lenge this tenet so that the "world of values" does not collapse.'
Can these two ideals be upheld simultaneously? If so, how can
they be reconciled?
Using the Polish context, this paper attempts to reach an
understanding of how the values of freedom and truth can
inform civil law, while respecting the rights of the individual. In
doing so, it utilizes Catholic social thought's understanding of
the relationship between morality and civil law, in particular the
distinction between the public order and the common good.
The argument of the paper unfolds in three parts. First, the
paper describes the debate in Polish discourse concerning the
relationship between freedom and truth and how these values
should shape society. This section highlights John Paul II's role
in this discussion. The second part of the paper uses the abor-
tion controversy to illustrate how talk of "freedom" and "truth"
functioned in public policy debates in Poland's fledgling democ-
racy. Finally, it applies aspects of Catholic social thought in
order to relax the tension between respect for the rights of the
individual in the democratic order and the need for civil law to
acknowledge the relationship between freedom and truth. In
doing so, this paper argues that while John Paul II's emphasis on
the relationship between freedom and truth remains vital to
democratic societies, the category of public order provides a
helpful and necessary clarification about the degree to which
church teaching and civil law should correspond.4 Put another
Done: the Catholic Church and Politics in Poland since 1989, in RELIGION IN AN
EXPANDING EUROPE 117-47 (Timothy A. Byrnes & Peter J. Katzenstein eds.,
2006) and Philipp Steger, The Long Good-bye to the Catholic Country or How Power-
ful is Poland's Roman Catholic Church?, in 7 PARADIGMS AND CONTENTIONS: IWM
JUNIOR VISITING FELLOWS CONFERENCES 1-26 (Maria Gomez et al. eds., 1999),
available at http://www.iwm.at/publjvc/c-07-10.pdf.
2. ADAM MICHNIK, KoscIOL, LEWICA, DIALOG 302 (1998); see also MICHNIK,
LETTERS FROM FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 178-83.
3. See MICHNIK, KoscIOL, LEWICA, DIALOG, supra note 2, at 302; see also
MICHNIK, LETTERS FROM FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 300-01.
4. This paper assumes that religious arguments in deliberations concern-
ing civil laws do not violate the First Amendment. For cogent arguments
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way, the argument here attempts to chart a middle-course
between those who wish to jettison all talk of "freedom and
truth" in discussions about civil law and those who lean towards
seeing Catholic moral doctrines and civil law as coextensive.
I. FREEDOM AND TRUTH IN CONTEMPORARY POLISH DIscouRsE
If I had to place one of the values cherished in Poland first
in lexical order, I would choose freedom.5
-J6zef Tischner
According to social ethicist Aniela Dylus, Poles love free-
dom. She points out that they fought for it throughout their
entire history, with the Roman Catholic Church as their main
ally.6 Indeed, one survey in 1995 revealed that 83% of adult
Poles view freedom as always being important, while a small
minority see it as important only sometimes or never. 7 Moreo-
ver, "freedom" ranks higher than other values such as social jus-
tice, welfare, and equality before the law.' Thus, the fact that
Poland's most prominent philosopher J6zef Tischner entitled a
book The Unfortunate Gift of Freedom after Poland's transformation
to democracy in 1989 may seem confounding.9 However, "free-
dom" represents one of the most highly controversial categories
in Poland today. A great deal of consternation stems from its
myriad, often conflicting interpretations. For example, accord-
ing to Polish neoliberals (i.e. proponents of economic liber-
alism) freedom amounts to "negative" freedom, or freedom from
coercion, particularly in the economic sphere. 0 This paper can-
against this popular misconception, see RONALD F. THIEMANN, RELIGION IN PUB-
LIC LIFE: A DILEMMA FOR DEMOCRACY (1996) and Susan Pace Hamill, An Argu-
ment for Tax Reform Based onJudeo-Christian Ethics, 54 ALA. L. REv. 1, 1-6 (2002).
5. ADAM MICHNIK, JOZEF TISCHNER, & JACEK ZAKOWSKI, MIEDZY PANEM A
PLEBANEM 42 (1995).
6. See ANIELA DYLUS, GOSPODARKA, MORALNOSC, CHRZESCIJANSTWO 95
(1994); see also TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE POLISH REVOLUTION: SOLIDARITY
(1984).
7. Janusz Mariafiski, Kryzys Moralny Czy Transformacja Wartosci? Na
Przykladzie Wartosci "Wolnosc', in ZIARNo CzyNu: REFLEKSJE PO V PIELGRZYMCE
JANA PAWEL II Do OJCzYzrNY: PRACA ZBIOROWA, ED. FRANCISZEK KAMPKA 117
(Franciszek Kampka ed. 1998).
8. Id.
9. TISCHNER, NIESZCZESNY DAR WOLNOSCI (1996).
10. See Andrzej Walicki, Ideolog Epoki Postchlubnej, GAZETA WYBORCZA, Nov.
8, 2003 at 18. Cf ANDRZEJ WALICKI, POLSKIE ZMAGANIA Z WOLNOSCIA 230-31
(2000). Wojciech Orlinski claims that Polish liberals accept the designation
"neoliberal" and follow Hayek and Friedman, the heralds of economic free-
dom, as opposed to Mill and Berlin, the defenders of political freedom.
Wojciech Orlinski, Wolnosc, Rownosc, Liberalism, GAZETA WYBoRCzA, July 25, 1999
at 16.
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not address all of the debates concerning the nature of freedom
in Poland after 1989.11 Rather, it focuses on freedom under-
stood as license, or what might be called moral permissivism.
This understanding of freedom, highly prevalent among Poles
today, clashes with John Paul II's repeated claim that freedom
must serve truth. As shall become clear, the tension between the
Pope's understanding of freedom and that of freedom construed
as license generates disagreement concerning the degree to
which civil law should curtail individual freedom.
On his last pilgrimage to his homeland, John Paul II decried
the fact that many people in contemporary Polish society make
decisions according to a "false ideology of freedom."12 In his
homily on August 18, 2002, he stated:
When the noisy propaganda of liberalism, freedom without
truth and responsibility, gains sway in our country as well,
the shepherds of the Church cannot refrain from preach-
ing the only and unfailing philosophy of freedom, which is
the truth of the cross of Christ. That philosophy of free-
dom is in essence related to the history of our country.
1 3
John Paul II, along with many others, located the root of a
misguided perspective on freedom in a kind of liberalism extant
in Poland today. The Pope may not have attacked liberalism per
se in his above-cited homily. However, he was certainly castigat-
ing those who espouse moral permissivism (freedom as
license).'" Moral permissivism (which does not necessarily sub-
scribe to or conflict with economic neoliberalism) is mainly con-
cerned with freedom in "private" moral matters, such as sexual
behavior, reproductive rights, freedom of expression, etc. John
Paul II decried moral permissivism in democratic Poland on
many occasions. His homily at the International Eucharistic
Congress in Wroclaw epitomizes his critique of moral permissiv-
ism's underlying notion of freedom:
11. For a full treatment of this issue, see GeraldJ. Beyer, The Unfinished
Revolution: Solidarity, Freedom and participation in Poland Through the Lens
of Catholic Social Thought (May 13, 2005) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation,
Boston College). A shorter treatment can be found in Gerald J. Beyer, What
Ever Became of Solidarity?, Am., Jan. 16-23, 2006, at 11-14.
12. Pope John Paul II, Misterium Nieprawosci I Wyobraznia Milosierdzia,
TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, Aug. 25, 2002.
13. Id.
14. He also clearly had in mind neoliberal economic thought. See Marcin
Krol, Liberalizm: Co to Wiasciwie Znaczy? TYGODNIK POWSZECHNY, Sept. 1, 2002.
For an overview of Catholic critiques of liberalism in Poland, see JERZY SZACKI,
LIBERaLISM AFTER COMMUNISM 177-206 (Chester A. Kisiel trans., Central Euro-
pean Univ. Press 1995) (1994).
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In a situation where a vacuum of values exists, where chaos
and confusion reigns, freedom perishes. The free human
person becomes a slave, a slave to instincts, passions and
pseudo-values. It is true that the order (lad) of freedom
can only be created with difficulty. Freedom always comes
at a cost.
1 5
In this homily, John Paul II criticized the "liberal ideology" that
denies freedom's relationship to truth. He also articulated a pos-
itive notion of freedom that is measured by the degree to which
one is ready to serve others and give of one's self.16
The Pope's worries appear to have some empirical basis.
Marian Filar, a self-described liberal politician, claims that "there
is nothing more important in an individual's existence and in
society's than the proper understanding of freedom."' 7 How-
ever, he worries that "Poles are generally fans of freedom, but
only one half of it, which says 'do what ever you want."' 18 In his
view, they forget about the other dimension of freedom, namely
its relationship to responsibility. Several sociological studies con-
clude that while Poles do not espouse moral relativism, they seem
to adopt a live and let live attitude. As one author puts it, "uni-
versal agreement exists concerning a great deal of the scope of
'good and evil,' but the majority of evil acts are acknowledged as
justifiable in practice." 9 While it would be imprudent to stereo-
15. POPE JOHN PAUL II, JAN PAWEL II W POLSCE, 31 MAJA-10 CZERWCA
1997: PRZEMOWIENA I HOMILIE 34 (1997).
16. He often repeated this idea on his pilgrimages in Poland, in addition
to mentioning it in his official encyclicals. John Paul II's teaching as pastor of
the universal church concerning this issue will be discussed in the final part of
this essay.
17. Krzystof Hajdamowicz & Marian Filar, Najpiekniejsza Jest Wolnosc,
GAZETA WYBORCZA, Nov. 25, 2003 at 21.
18. Id.
19. Hanna Swida-Ziemba, Permisywizm MoraIny a Postawy Polskiej Mlodziezy,
in KONDYCJA MORALNA SPOLECZENSTWA POLSKIEGO 439 (Janusz Marianski ed.,
2002). For similar claims based on research, see Anita Miszalska, Moralnosc a
Demokracja-Uwagi 0 Stylu Moralnym Wspolczesnego Spoleczenstwa Polskiego, in
KONDYCJA MORALNA SPOLECZENSTWA POLSKIEGO 164, 169-72 (2002); Krzystof
Kicinski, Orientacje Moralne Spoleczenstwa Polskiego, in KONDYCJA MORALNA
SPOLECZENSWWA POLSKIEGO 375-77 (2002); Janusz Marianski, Religia i Moralnosc
w Spoleczenstwie Polskim, in KONDYCJA MORALNA SPOLECZENSTWA POLSKIEGO
492-501 (2002). Interestingly, Marianski, who shares the view that permissivism
is growing in Poland, shows that social acceptance of abortion (for any reason)
has fallen in the last decade. Nonetheless, it remains at a relatively high number
(roughly half) given that more than 90% of Poles are Roman Catholics.
Agnieszka Graf contends, however, that only 26% of women are against the
right to abortion. See AGNIESZKA GRAFF, SWIAT BEz KOBIET: PLEC W POtSIM
ZvcIu PUBLICZNYM 112 (2001). A nuanced discussion of this issue cannot be
undertaken here. See GoWIN, KoscioL W CZASACH WOLNOSCI, supra note 1, at
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type the entire Polish people as "morally permissive," it appears
that there is a tendency among many Poles to understand free-
dom individualistically and as license. Janusz Marianski, a
renowned sociologist from the Catholic University of Lublin,
notes that one-third of adults and two-fifths of young Poles
understand freedom as the ability to act as one wishes, regardless
of objective norms.2 ° He states one of his conclusions as follows:
" [T] he perception of freedom as the license to act without barri-
ers is growing. A radically permissive society fosters indifference
to the fate of others."2 Is Poland radically permissive? One
should not jump to rash conclusions based on limited sociologi-
cal data. Moreover, Marianski's research shows that a majority of
Poles do not see freedom as license.22 However, it is difficult not
to see that consumerism and moral permissivism play a negative
role in Polish society today. After years of Communist control of
goods, which often led to material deprivation and censorship,
Poles now experience the "freedom to choose" from among fully
stocked store shelves. They also have the freedom to express
their views in the public square. This new situation obviously has
positive and negative aspects. For example, great technological
advances have made their way to Poland. Poles rightly highly
value their right to free speech and freedom of association.
2 3
Polish society is beginning to address many subjects that were
once "taboo," such as spousal abuse, infertility and homosexual-
ity. However, as Aniela Dylus points out, there is a great tempta-
tion to equate freedom with the unfettered ability to consume
goods, among them pornography, drugs, etc. In her words, "at
the moment, not everyone realizes that the challenging freedom
in post-Communist Poland should not be equated with
postmodern free-reign."2 4 The Polish bishops condemned the
growing culture of consumerism in Poland in several Synod doc-
uments, linking it with freedom "experienced as following one's
150-94 for the church's stance on it and GRAFF, SWIAT BEZ KOBIET: PLEC W
POLSKIM ZYCIU PUBLICZNYM 111-51 for an alternative point of view. For discus-
sions of the abortion debate in Poland in English, see Urszula Nowakowska &
Maja Korzeniewska, Women's Reproductive Rights, in POLISH WOMEN IN THE 90'S:
THE REPORT BY THE WOMEN'S RIGHTS CENTER 219 (Urszula Nowakowska ed.,
2002); Ramet, supra note 1, at 130-33; and Steger, supra note 1, at 14-23.
20. Marianski, supra note 7, at 120.
21. Id. at 121.
22. Id.
23. See JADwiGA KORALEWICZ & MAREK ZIOLKOWSKI, MENTALNOSC
POLAKOW: SPOSOBY MYSLENIA 0 POLITYCE, GOSPODARCE I Z'CIU SPOLECZNYM
1988-2000, 200 (2003).
24. DvLus, supra note 6, at 98.
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instincts" and selectively following or abandoning objective
moral norms.
25
This situation has caused the Polish bishops to fear that
many Poles believe democracy grants equal rights to "saints" and
"sinners."26 In other words, all citizens have the freedom to do
whatever they choose, regardless of the moral status of their
actions. This line of thinking equates liberal democracy with lib-
ertarianism. Accordingly, the church cannot formally impose its
moral teachings on citizens via civil law reflecting those teach-
ings. It is important to note, however, that many Polish defend-
ers of liberal democracy do not unequivocally endorse
libertarianism. For example, Adam Michnik embraces a notion
of freedom understood as the freedom to choose, even to choose
sin. "Every freedom, even sinful and disfigured, is better than
any kind of dictatorship," he argues.27 By the same token, he
lauds John Paul II's critique of the "postmodern nihilism and cri-
sis of life and thinking according to values." 2' Roman Graczyk, a
Roman Catholic journalist and author of Polski Koscid-Poska
Demokracja [The Polish Church and Polish Democracy], reaches
similar conclusions. He maintains that John Paul II does not dif-
ferentiate between legal norms and moral norms and that "lib-
eral democracy treats evil as the price of freedom."29 Yet, it is the
church that must teach Poles respect for authentic freedom, not
freedom conceived as license. According to Graczyk, it has not
yet done so in word or deed.3° In the end, however, both
Michnik and Graczyk fear that democratic freedom in Poland is
threatened more by religious fanaticism and/or the desire for
theocracy than by moral permissivism or moral relativism. Polish
literati such as renowned philosopher Leszek Kolakowski and
25. Polish Bishops Conference, Potneba I Zadania Nowj Ewangelizacji Na
Przelomie H III Tysiaclecia Chrzecijanskiego paras. 26, 27 (Feb. 27, 2001), available
at http://www.episkopat.pl/dokumenty/files/synoddokumenty.pdf. See also
Polish Bishops Conference, Kosciol Wobec Zycia Spoleczno-Gospodarczego para. 52
(2001), available at http://www.episkopat.pl/dokumenty/files/synoddoku-
menty.pdf.
26. See supra note 25. See also TADEUSZ PIERONEK, KoscIOL NE Boi SIE
WOLNOSCI 92-93 (1998).
27. MICHNIK, KoSCIOL, LEWIcA, DIALoG, supra note 2, at 308. See also
MICHNIK, LEarERS FROM FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 178-83.
28. MICHNIK, KoSCIOL, LEWIcA, DIALOG, supra note 2, at 310. See also
MICHNIK, LETTERS FROM FREEDOM, supra note 1, at 300-01.
29. ROMAN GRAczK, PoLsI KOscl6L-POLsKA DEMOKRACJA 20-21
(1999).
30. Id. at 15-22, 44.
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Nobel poet laureate Czeslaw Milosz have expressed similar
concerns.
3 1
II. FREEDOM, TRUTH, AND THE ISSUE OF ABORTION
The abortion controversy in Poland after 1989 brought dis-
agreements about "freedom" and "truth" sharply into relief. It
also illustrated how these disagreements about the nature of free-
dom and truth in turn lead to quarrels about the relationship
between moral norms and civil law.32 It is true that a range of
arguments for and against the banning of abortion in Poland
existed, which did not explicitly appeal to the "freedom" of the
individual or freedom's relationship to truth. For example, while
some people acknowledged that abortion is a moral evil, they
maintained that making it illegal would not actually stem the
number of abortions performed annually in Poland.33 This kind
of argument has little to do with a notion of freedom that grants
a woman the right to choose, which is based on either moral rela-
tivism or moral permissivism.34 Rather, it is simply an attempt to
mitigate actions and their consequences, both of which are per-
ceived to be objectively evil. In addition to this type of argumen-
tation, however, many opponents and defenders of the right to
abortion employed different understandings of freedom and its
relationship to truth to make their cases.
As was mentioned earlier, John Paul II bemoaned moral
permissivism in Poland on many occasions, often portraying
abortion as its worst manifestation. During his first visit to demo-
cratic Poland in 1991, a rancorous debate concerning abortion
legislation was underway.35 John Paul II expressed his views
unabashedly in a series of homilies and speeches. For example,
after a diatribe against abortion in one homily, he argued:
31. See Kolakowski, supra note 1; Milosz, supra note 1.
32. See, e.g., TADEUSZ PIERONEK, KoscIOL NIE Boi SIE WOLNoscI 27 (1998)
(stating that the three most important issues concerning the "use of freedom"
in Poland were the return of religion classes to public schools, abortion, and
respecting Christian values in mass media).
33. GoWiN, KoscioL W CZASACH WOLNOSCI, supra note 1, at 170-79. This
is in fact what happened after the restrictive law was passed. See Steger, supra
note 1, at 21-22; Ramet, supra note 1, at 132-33.
34. In other words, arguing for the right to abortion as a woman's right to
choose must either hinge on the belief that abortion cannot be declared objec-
tively evil, or that abortion is objectively evil, yet justified if a woman sees it
fitting.
35. A detailed and chronological description of this debate exceeds the
scope of this essay. For such an account, see GOWIN, KosciOL W CZASACH
WOLNOSCI, supra note 1, at 150-89; Steger, supra note 1, at 14-23; Ramet, supra
note 1, at 130-33; Nowakowska & Korzeniewska, supra note 19.
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You cannot speak of freedom here, because this is freedom
that enslaves. Yes, maturing to freedom is necessary,
mature freedom is necessary. Society, the nation and all
aspects of family life can only be founded on this kind of
freedom. But we cannot create the falsehood of freedom,
which allegedly frees the human person, but actually
enslaves and depraves the human person. The Republic of
Poland needs to undergo an examination of conscience!3 6
In his speech to the Polish Parliament, he spoke of "integral
solidarity," which extends to all persons-including the
unborn-and its link to freedom. 7 He called on Polish leaders
to remember that freedom must be used to promote solidarity
and that freedom must be "grounded in the truth."3 8 It is clear
from the context that John Paul II was calling for the "responsi-
ble use of freedom" in order to protect the rights of the
unborn.3 9 In a separate speech on that pilgrimage, he lauded a
group of legislators working on a bill to ban abortion in all situa-
tions.4 ° In short, John Paul II attempted to convince his compa-
triots that the decision to justify abortion is rooted in a false
understanding of freedom during several of his pilgrimages.4 '
The Polish bishops echoed this theme in several statements and
pastorals.4 2 Fr. J6zef Tischner, one of Poland's most prominent
public intellectuals, defended John Paul II's insistence on the
36. Pope John Paul II, Homilia W Czasie Mszy Sw.Odprawionej Na




39. Pope John Paul II, Przem6wienie Do Przedstawicieli Wiadz
Panstwowych Wygloszone Na Zamku Kr6lewskim (June 8, 1991), available at
http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/W/WP/jan-pawel-ii/przemowienia/
34warszawa_08061991.html. For a discussion of the relationship between free-
dom and truth, with some mention of contemporary Polish society, see POPE
JOHN PAUL II, MEMORY AND IDENTITY 33-55 (2005).
40. See Pope John Paul II, Slowo Do Parlamentarzystow-Inicjatorow
Ustawy Dotyczacej Prawnej Ochrony Dziecka Poczetego (June 8, 1991), available
at http://www.opoka.org.pl/biblioteka/W/WP/anpawelii/przemowienia/
36warszawa_08061991.html.
41. See, e.g., POPE JOHN PAUL II, JAN PAWEL II W POLSCE, 31 MAJA-10
CZERWCA 1997: PRZEMOW1ENIA I HOMILIE 102-04; POPEJOHN PAUL II, PROGRAM
DLA KoscIoLA W POLSCE: JAN PAWEL II Do POLSKICH BISKUPOW, WIZYTA AD
LIMINA 1998, at 31 (Znak 1998).
42. See, e.g., Polish Bishops Conference, Potrzeba I Zadania Nowe Ewange-
lizacji Na Przelomie III H1 Tysiaclecia Chizecijanskiego (2001), available at http://
www.episkopat.pl/dokumenty/files/synoddokumenty.pdf; Polish Bishops Con-
ference, Powolanie Do Zycia W Malzenstwie I Rodzinie (2001), available at http://
www.episkopat.pl/dokumenty/files/synoddokumenty.pdf; PIERONEK, supra note
32, at 94.
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relationship between freedom and truth, adding his own
nuances to the discussion.4" Tischner, who advocated "positive
liberalism," which he also referred to as Christian liberalism,
maintained that liberal democracy need not grant a monopoly to
negative freedom in its legal structures. However, he acknowl-
edged more clearly than John Paul II that democracies "can
never fully reflect Christian ideals."'  While he condemned
abortion as a moral evil, one to be eradicated over time, he sup-
ported a compromise bill that would have limited, but not elimi-
nated abortion in Poland in the 1990's.
45
Opponents of the Pope also appealed to a conception of
freedom to make their case for the right to abortion. For exam-
ple, Graczyk claims that John Paul II most blatantly equates
moral and legal norms in his statements about abortion.46 Grac-
zyk goes on to say that in liberal democracy "freedom permits
evil, while a system antithetical to freedom, which systematically
fights evil, cannot eliminate it."47 Graczyk's emphasis on "nega-
tive freedom," the hallmark of liberal democracy according to
Jerzy Szacki,4" leads him to justify permitting abortions. In his
view, if social consensus demands the legalization of abortion, it
should be legal, even if abortion is an objective moral evil.49
While Graczyk and others defend the right to abortion as
part of a larger, philosophical case for liberalism, others do so
primarily to advocate women's rights and the right to abortion.5"
According to Jaroslaw Gowin, the argument for a woman's right
to an abortion was primarily grounded in claims about freedom,
with concerns such as the health of the mother and financial
hardship playing a secondary role.51 A declaration signed by
43. See, e.g., JOZEF TISCHNER, MYSLENIE WEDLUG WARTOSCI 196 (2000);
J6ZEF TISCHNER, W KRAINIE SCHOROWANEJ WYOBRAZNI, 137-49 (1997). Cf JARoS-
LAw GOWIN, RELIGIA I LUDZKIE BIEDY: KSIEDZA TISCHNERA SPORY 0 KosciOL
183-89 (2003).
44. TISCHNER, NIESZCZESNY DAR WOLNOSCI, supra note 1, at 139.
45. Id. at 139-41. Cf Id. at 10-12. John Paul II permits such a toleration
of a "lesser evil" in POPE JOHN PAUL II, EVANGELIUM VITAE: THE GOSPEL OF LIFE
para. 73 (1995) [hereinafter EVANGELIUM VITAE]. However, John Paul II did not
allow for such a compromise in his discussions in Poland in the early nineties.
See Pope John Paul II, supra note 36; Pope John Paul II, supra note 39; Pope
John Paul II, supra note 40, and POPE JOHN PAUL II, supra note 41.
46. GRAczvK, supra note 29, at 18.
47. Id. at 21.
48. SzAcEJ, supra note 14, at 196.
49. GRAczyK, supra note 29, at 18-21.
50. In other words, they are not arguing that one political system (liberal
democracy) promotes women's rights better than another (such as social
democracy, socialism, etc.).
51. GOWIN, supra note 1, at 173-74.
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numerous groups that appeared in the Polish journal Bez
Dogmatu reveals this tendency: "Parliament should adapt Polish
abortion law in accordance with the most important principle for
creating democratic laws: respect for the freedom of individuals.
Practically speaking, this means passing a bill that makes termi-
nating pregnancy (in its early stages) dependent on the sover-
eign decision of the woman."52 In likewise fashion, a report on
women's rights in Poland begins its chapter on reproductive
rights as follows: "Women must have reproductive control over
their bodies in order to exercise basic rights due to every human
being. Limited access to family planning, including the right to
terminate an unwanted pregnancy, violates basic human rights,
as well as the right to freedom, protection of health, and life."53
Agnieszka Graff, one of Poland's foremost feminist writers,
also uses this kind of argumentation. She juxtaposes terms such
as "freedom" and "freedom to choose" with the language of her
opponents, who use terms like "defense of life."54 In her critique
of the abortion debate in Poland, she claims the term "life" has
inappropriately dominated the discussion.5" She wants the focus
to return to a discussion of a woman's freedom. In her view,
Poland's restrictive abortion laws obviate a woman's right to
determine choices that affect her "personally and intimately."56
She detests the fact that lawmakers believe they have the right to
encroach on a woman's privacy, imposing laws that are rooted in
their worldview.
5 7
Whether explicitly or implicitly, the classic conception of
"negative freedom" undergirds these arguments for the right to
abortion. As Szacki states, freedom is thus understood as the
"removal of the obstacles that rise up on the way to realization of
the innate rights of the individual, not to decide what the individ-
ual should do to be good, wise and happy."5" To put it another
way, the understanding of freedom as "freedom from" coheres
with an understanding of human rights as negative rights. A per-
son is free when no other person or institution coerces her, i.e.,
when the principle of noninterference is upheld. Rights are like
52. Id. at 174.
53. Nowakowska & Korzeniewska, supra note 19, at 219.
54. See GRAFF, supra note 19, at 120.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 118.
57. See id. at 118-20. For interesting examples of art works depicting this
motif, see Federation of Women and Family Planning, http://www.federa.org.
pl/konkurs/wyniki%20konkursu-16.03-%20B.htm. These images are the result
of a contest to produce a work of art depicting the theme "my life, my decision."
58. SZACK], supra note 14, at 196.
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signposts, demarcating areas in which one's personal freedom
should not be impinged upon.59 Positive freedom, i.e. "freedom
for," corresponds to an understanding of human rights as that
which enable human persons to participate in fostering the com-
mon good and benefiting from it.6" Human rights in this sense
are "positive" in that they empower people to strive towards some
end.6
To summarize, the abortion debate in contemporary Poland
exemplifies how champions of "freedom for" in the service of
truth are pitted against proponents of negative freedom. The
latter have often viewed the former as enemies of liberal democ-
racy, echoing Sir Isaiah Berlin and his claim that efforts to pro-
mote "positive freedom" or "true freedom" and its inherent
relationship to the truth lead down the road to totalitarianism.62
They therefore argue that civil law should remain completely
divorced from discussions of "freedom and truth." They claim
that the church lumps all moral vices "into one basket," to be
eliminated in toto by restrictive civil laws. Accordingly, they
imply the Church deems acts such as viewing pornographic
materials, use of artificial contraception, homosexual relations,
59. See H.L.A. HART, Are There Any Natural Rights, in THEORIES OF NATU-
RAL RIGHTS 77 (Jeremy Waldron ed., 1984). See also HENRY SHUE, BASIC RIGHTS:
SUBSISTENCE, AFFLUENCE, AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY 35-64 (2d ed. 1996).
60. While the negative/positive freedom distinction predates him, Isaiah
Berlin is mainly responsible for its currency today. See Isaiah Berlin, Two Con-
cepts of Liberty, in LIBERTY- INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 166 (Henry
Hardy ed., 2002); Gerald MacCallum cogently revealed the inherent flaws of
the negative/positive freedom dichotomy in Gerald C. MacCallum, Negative and
Positive Freedom, 76 THE PHIL. REv. 312 (1967). Although MacCallum is persua-
sive, this paper uses the distinction because it functions in the minds of many
people today and is still used in many types of discourse. The terms may point
to different aspects of a unitary freedom, but many people sever them, thereby
conceiving of two different kinds of freedom.
61. For a fuller elaboration of this understanding of human fights, see
David Hollenbach, A Communitarian Reconstruction of Human Rights: Contributions
from Catholic Tradition, in CATHOLICISM AND LIBERALISM 127 (R. Bruce Douglass
& David Hollenbach eds., 1994).
62. Berlin, supra note 60, at 179-80. See also Isaiah Berlin, Liberty, in LIB-
ERTY. INCORPORATING FOUR ESSAYS ON LIBERTY 283, 286 (Henry Hardy ed.,
2002). In Poland, Leszek Kolakowski has said that seeing "true" freedom as
"positive" freedom led St. Augustine to justify oppressive regimes if they pro-
hibit sinners from sinning. By limiting one's ability to do illicit acts, the oppres-
sive regime creates the conditions for true freedom, which develops as one
continues to avoid sin and to do "the good." In Kolakowski's view, this lies as
that basis of totalitarian ideologies, including Soviet Communism. See Leszek
Kolakowski, Laik Nad Katechizmem Sie Wymadrza, 62 PULS (1992), cited in TISCH-
NER, W KRAINIE SCHOROWANEJ WYOBRAZNI, supra note 43, at 144-45.
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and abortion equally reprehensible.63 All such immoral behav-
iors should be banned by law.
The Church contributes to this misunderstanding of its
teaching when it denounces false freedom and liberal democracy
tout court, giving the impression that it wants all of its moral
teaching to be the law of the land. John Paul I may have unwit-
tingly conveyed this in his speeches and homilies in Poland, even
though, as shall be discussed below, he disavowed this idea in his
encyclical Evangelium Vitae. Should viewing pornography be out-
lawed? Should the distribution and use of artificial contracep-
tion be illegal? Should homosexual activity be banned by the
state? While such behaviors are immoral in the eyes of the
church, should individuals who do not espouse the Catholic
Church's views have a right to engage in them in a liberal democ-
racy? Talk of freedom and truth as bases of civil law may be con-
strued as an endorsement of the old "error has no rights"
dictum, which would proscribe all behaviors contrary to Catholic
doctrines.
Yet, much of the Catholic tradition has eschewed "legislating
morality," i.e. enshrining the full panoply of the church's moral
teachings in civil law. Can the Church persuasively talk of free-
dom and truth, stemming the tide of relativism, as Michnik
would like, while circumventing the accusation that it disdains
liberal democracy and individual rights?64 The next section of
this paper will attempt to answer this question by providing a
more nuanced account of the Catholic understanding of moral-
ity and its relationship to civil law.
First, it will explain John Paul II's teaching on freedom and
truth in more detail to reveal its enduring importance to modem
democracies. In other words, it will offer a defense of John Paul
II's position. Then, this paper will introduce the concept of the
public order to demonstrate that while the Church must speak of
freedom and truth and their relationship to civil law, it also
upholds respect for the rights of the individual. Such clarifica-
63. This does not intend to trivialize the negative aspects of the pornogra-
phy industry, treatment of those in it and the negative effects of viewing it on
the human person and his or her relational partners. Moreover, certain kinds
of pornography, such as that involving children or violence, are more morally
problematic than others. At the risk of stating the obvious, the point here is to
demonstrate that not all morally reprehensible acts are equally grave and
harmful.
64. The accusation has obvious historical roots. The Roman Catholic
Church did not fully accept democracy until the pontificate of Pius XII after
World War II. In earlier times it was very critical towards liberal democracy. See,
e.g., CHARLEs E. CURRAN, CATHOLIC SocIAL TEACHING 1891-PRESENT: A HISTORI-
CAL, THEOLOGICAL, & ETHICAL ANALYsIs 215-22 (2002).
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tions might quell the fears of some Poles (and commentators
beyond Poland) that the Church, particularly John Paul II,
returned to the "error has no rights" teaching. John Paul II's
teaching on religious freedom reveals that he did not embrace
this dictum. Far from advocating the suppression of believers
outside the Catholic faith, the Pope claimed that "religious free-
dom.., constitutes the very heart of human rights."65 However,
in light of the debates described in this essay, it remains neces-
sary to introduce some clarifications to his discussion of freedom,
truth, and civil law.
III. FREEDOM, TRUTH, PUBLIC ORDER, AND CIVIL LAW
While John Paul II stressed the relationship between free-
dom and truth on his trips to Poland, he expounded this teach-
ing more methodically in his encyclicals, such as Evangelium
Vitae66 and Veritatis Splendor.6 7  In order to understand his
thought more fully, it is important to look to these more carefully
crafted arguments. In Veritatis Splendor, Evangelium Vitae, and
elsewhere in his official teaching, John Paul II claimed that deny-
ing the link between freedom and truth can lead and has led to
totalitarianism. When the objective demands of natural law on
persons and states are not recognized, social life becomes a war
of all against all, to paraphrase Hobbes.6" Nothing guarantees
just relations among people. A tyranny of the majority often pro-
motes its interests against the rights of the weak and disen-
franchised.69 In Evangelium Vitae, he spoke of a false conception
65. Pope John Paul II, Message of His Holiness Pope John Paul II for the
Celebration of the World Day of Peace: "Respect for Human Rights: The Secret
of True Peace, para. 5 (Jan. 1, 1999), available at http://www.vatican.va/holy_
father/john-paul-ii/messages/peace/documents/hfjp-iimes_14121998_xxx
ii-world-day-for-peace.en.html. However, in light of the debates described in
this essay, it remains necessary to introduce some clarifications to his discussion
of freedom, truth and civil law. For an example of an American commentator
who appears to share this fear, see Leslie Griffin, Commentary on Dignitatis
Humanae (Declaration on Religious Freedom), in MODERN CATHOLIC SociAL TEACH-
ING 244, 256-60 (Kenneth Himes et al. eds., 2003).
66. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45.
67. POPEJOHN PAUL II, VERITATIS SPLENDOR (1993) [hereinafter VERITATIS
SPLENDOR].
68. THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 76 (Edwin Curley, ed., 1994).
69. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 67, at para. 4; EVANGELIUM VITAE,
supra note 45, at para. 70. This resembles Martin Luther King's appeal to an
eternal and natural law in "A Letter from a Birmingham Jail." See Martin
Luther King, Jr., Letter From Birmingham Jail (1964), reprinted in S. JONATHAN
BASS, BLESSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS 237-56 (2001). King explicitly cites
Thomas Aquinas' claim that an unjust law is a human law not rooted in eternal
and natural law. Id. at 244.
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of freedom lying at the root of the "culture of death" that con-
dones contraception, sterilization, abortion, and euthanasia.70 It
is an understanding of freedom that exalts the individual, pre-
cludes solidarity with others, and denies the existence of any
absolutely binding truth. In the Pope's view, this leads to a soci-
ety in which individuals feel free to assert their interests against
one another, without any concern for the rights of others.
71
This, according to the late pontiff, spells the "death of true free-
dom. ' 72 To quote David Hollenbach's summary of the pope's
message, "[freedom that is not anchored in . . . [basic] truths
about the person is not freedom at all."
73
Herein resides one of the confusions regarding the Pope's
teaching concerning freedom and truth. John Paul did not
always elucidate the nature of "the truth" that he proclaimed. In
addition, his opponents often did not attempt to discern the
meaning behind his iterations of "truth." First and foremost,
John Paul I stressed freedom in the service of the truth about
the human person.7 1 What truth or truths about the human per-
son? J6zef Tischner provides an important hermeneutic key:
"You cannot understand John Paul II's thought if you do not
realize that it arose from the world of Auschwitz and Kolyma."
75
Tischner's observation clues us in to John Paul II's primary con-
70. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, at para. 19.
71. Id. at para. 18.
72. See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, at paras. 18-21. On the link
between freedom and truth, see also POPE JOHN PAUL II, REDEMPTOR HOMINIS:
THE REDEEMER OF MAN paras. 12, 16 (1979) [hereinafter REDEMPTOR HOMINIS];
POPE JOHN PAUL II, CENTESIMUS ANNUS: ON THE HUNDREDTH ANNIVERSARY OF
RERUM NOVARUM paras. 4, 41, 44, 46 (1991) [hereinafter CENTESIMUS ANNUS];
POPE JOHN PAUL II, FAMILIARIS CONSORTIO: THE CHRISTIAN FAMILY IN THE MOD-
ERN WORLD paras. 1, 4, 13, 30, 31, 32, 34 (1981).
73. David Hollenbach, Tradition, Historicity and Truth in Theological Ethics,
in CHRISTIAN ETHICS: PROBLEMS AND PROSPECTS, 60, 63 (Lisa Sowle Cahill &
James F. Childress eds., 1996). This section is indebted to Hollenbach's linking
ofJohn Paul II's emphasis on freedom and truth to the dissident movements of
Central and Eastern Europe.
74. See REDEMPTOR HOMINIS, supra note 72, at para. 12; EVANGELIUM
VITAE, supra note 45, at para 71. Cf TISCHNER, W KRAINIE SCHOROWANEJ
WYOBRAZNI, supra note 43, at 196.
75. TISCHNER, W KRAINIE SCHOROWANEJ WYOBRAZNI, supra note 43, at 157.
Located in Northeastern Siberia, Kolyma was the largest of the Soviet work
camps. It is estimated that more than two million people died in Kolyma alone.
See ROBERT CONQUEST, THE GREAT TERROR: A REASSESSMENT 325 (1990). While
an exact accounting is impossible, some approximate that more than one mil-
lion Poles were deported to these camps, most of whom never returned to their
homeland. See STtPHANE COURTOIS ET AL, THE BLACK BOOK OF COMMUNISM 209
(1997); NORMAN DAVIES, 2 BOZE IGRzYSKO: HISTOmA POLSKA 492 (Elzbieta
Tabakowska, trans. 1997).
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cerns regarding "truth." When the truth about the dignity of
every human person is silenced, as it was by the Nazis and the
Soviet regime, the very basis for human rights is undercut. If the
human person does not possess inviolable dignity, one of the
core truths about the human according to Catholic thought, the
bulwark against the totalitarian state's squashing of the individual
vanishes. The inherent rights of the human person become sub-
ordinated to the "greater good" of the whole.76 Sometimes this
takes the form of discrimination against minorities in the interest
of the majority. It may also entail the economic, political, and
cultural oppression of the weak by the powerful. In more
extreme cases such as Nazism and Stalinism, the ideological goals
of Aryan supremacy and Communist utopia demanded the exter-
mination of all those who stood in the way of their realization.
The only safeguard against such pernicious ideologies is a
commitment to truth, above all the truth about the human per-
son. Thus, for example, the Solidarity movement in Poland
called for "life in truth. ' 77 Life in truth required having an
understanding of the human person as one imbued with inviola-
ble dignity having the capacity for freedom realized in solidarity,
and called to participation. This shared anthropology allowed
for the unity in a common cause, which became known as Soli-
darity, among Christians, Jews, atheists, and agnostics. 78 It was
the basis for uncovering the anthropological lie of Communism
and the source of a potent critique against totalitarian regimes
throughout Central and Eastern Europe.
In contrast to the anthropology held by members of the Soli-
darity movement, John Paul II described the anthropological fal-
lacy of socialism as follows:
Socialism considers the individual person simply as an ele-
ment, a molecule within the social organism, so that the
good of the individual is completely subordinated to the
functioning of the socioeconomic mechanism. Socialism
likewise maintained that the good of the individual can be
realized without reference to his free choice, to the unique
76. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 72, at para. 44. SeejAcQuEs MARITAIN,
THE PERSON AND THE COMMON GOOD 90-97 (John J. Fitzgerald trans., 1947).
77. See Gerald J. Beyer, A Theoretical Appreciation of the Ethic of Solidarity in
Poland Twenty-Five Years After, 35J. RELIGIOUS ETHICS 207-32 (forthcoming June
2007).
78. Jaroslaw Gowin, Kosciol a "Solidarnosc", in Lekcja Sierpnia: Dziedzictwo
"SOLIDARNOSCI" Po DWUDZIESTU LATACH 28 (Dariusz Gawin ed., 2002). Gowin
argues against those who claim solidarity requires explicit belief in God. He
appeals to the example of Albert Camus and his "heroic atheism." For a fuller
discussion of Solidarity's notion of "life in truth," see Beyer, supra note 77.
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and exclusive responsibility which he exercises in the face
of good and evil.79
By contrast, the anthropology espoused by the Solidarity
movement, which characterized the human person as one of dig-
nity, freedom, solidarity, and participation, represents the basis
of the Catholic understanding of human rights. The authentic
exercise of freedom entails recognizing this truth about the
human person and acting in accordance with it, i.e. acting in
accordance with human nature itself. This means acting in order
to respect and promote the rights of all persons because all
humans possess inviolable dignity. Protecting human dignity
requires fostering human rights. Protecting human dignity can
only be achieved in freedom and solidarity.8 0
Thus, while thinkers such as Berlin and Kolakowski warned
that talk of positive freedom often leads to political and legal
structures that demolish individual rights, John Paul II main-
tained that in our era an equally potent threat to human rights
resides in the denial of the relationship between freedom and
the truth. Who was right: the esteemed philosophers or John
Paul II? It is not possible here to determine which "road" leads
to totalitarianism faster. Furthermore, these two theses need not
be mutually exclusive. Indeed, John Paul II admitted that evils
have been committed in the name of "truth.
8 1
J6zef Tischner pithily framed the problem as follows:
"[H]ow can one respect human rights, not knowing the truth
about the human person and the truth about the rights of the
person?" 2 If we cannot claim that certain, basic truths about the
human person are unchanging, we cannot argue that all human
beings share the same basic rights. If human nature is entirely
"malleable," human persons correspondingly have "malleable"
worth, social utility, etc. This is not to deny that many character-
istics of human personhood are socially and historically condi-
tioned. In addition, knowledge from human experience and the
sciences continues to contribute to an ever greater understand-
79. CENTESIMUS ANNUS, supra note 72, at para. 13.
80. For a fuller explanation of the link between theological anthropology
and human rights in Catholic thought, see Gerald J. Beyer, Beyond "Nonsense on
Stilts": Towards Conceptual Clarity and Resolution of Conflicting Economic Rights,
HUM. RTS. REv., July-Sept. 2005, at 5-32.
81. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, at para. 70.
82. TISCHNER, W KRAINIE SCHOROWANEJ WYOBRAZNI, supra note 43, at 75.
For a similar perspective, see POPE JOHN PAUL II, MEMORY AND IDENTITY, supra
note 39, at 33-55.
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ing of human personhood s3  Such insights can and should
inform reflection on how human dignity should be protected.
For example, in a recent article, Cristina Traina has argued that
despite the well-founded admonitions and legal prohibitions of
adults touching children in a variety of contexts, a growing body
of psychological research has shown that children need the firm
touch of adults for healthy development, i.e. for their flourishing
as humans.8 4 On this basis, she argues for a "right to be touched
in an appropriate manner."8 " Thus, we must recognize the cul-
tural and historical relativity of certain anthropological assump-
tions and admit the need for the continued analysis of human
personhood. However, if we cannot acknowledge certain "core"
truths about the human person that exist across time and cul-
tures, it makes little sense to talk of universal human rights. It is
no accident, therefore, that the idea of natural law regained cur-
rency during the Nuremberg trials.8 6 It is also no surprise that
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was drafted in the
wake of the Holocaust, which egregiously denied the fundamen-
tal dignity of every human person. 7
The social psychologist Erich Fromm has also provided sup-
port for the Pope's thesis. Drawing on Fromm, Tischner argued
that ignoring the truth about the human person, her freedom,
her rights, and her responsibilities prompted Germans during
the Third Reich and people in post-Communist societies such as
Poland to "escape from freedom."88 Based on his clinical experi-
ence as a psychoanalyst and his reading of modern history,
Fromm concluded that the reluctance and inability to "live into"
one's freedom, which for Fromm was intrinsically related to mak-
ing choices and taking responsibility, led people to abrogate
their duties as humans and citizens and seek solace in authorita-
rian figures.8 9 This is why people allowed authoritarian regimes
83. Many readers will notice the indebtedness here to Jacques Maritain's
understanding of the evolution of human awareness of natural law. SeeJAcQUES
MARITAIN, NATURAL LAw: REFLECTIONS ON THEORY AND Practice 25-74 (1982).
84. Cristina Traina, Touch on Trial: Power and the Right to Physical Affection,
25J. Soc'Y CHRISTIAN ETHICS 3 (2005).
85. Id.
86. See Eric D'Arcy, Natural Law, in 3 THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS
1131, 1135 (Warren T. Reich ed., 1978) (highlighting the varying views on Nat-
ural Law and its contemporary revival in the postwar trials of Nazi war
criminals).
87. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR,
3d Sess., 183d plen. mtg., U.N. Doc A/810 (Dec. 10, 1948).
88. TISCHNER, W KRAINIE SCHOROWANEJ WYOBRAZNI, supra note 43, at 75.
89. ERICH H. FROMM, ESCAPE FROM FREEDOM 150-51 (First Owl Books
1994).
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and dictators to control their lives.9° The inability to embrace
one's freedom (in the positive sense) arises from the "unbear-
able feeling of aloneness and powerlessness" encountered by
modern individuals, who have largely obtained negative freedom
in liberal democracies, but are also "free" from community."
This sense of alienation leads to masochistic behaviors in an
attempt to "get rid of the burden of freedom."92 Fromm saw this
type of psychological mechanism at work in the rise of Fascist
movements in Germany and Italy in the first half of the twentieth
century.9 3 The Nazis capitalized on the malaise of the German
masses by propagating an anthropological lie similar to that of
Communism. As evidenced in the writings of Hitler and Goeb-
bels, Nazism proclaimed that the domination of people is for
their own good, and that eventually the dominated will come to
recognize their need to sacrifice themselves, their beliefs, their
ambitions, and their desires for the good of the whole. 4 Fromm
states that being repeatedly told "the individual counts for noth-
ing" in the midst of the alienation experienced by the modern
masses fostered the desire to "annihilate the self," succumb to a
"higher power," and then "feel proud in participating in the
strength and glory of this higher power."9 5 In other words, the
escape from freedom into the hands of an authoritarian master
functions as a way of coping with the modern predicament,
marked by freedom from the constraints experienced by those of
the medieval world on the one hand, and the loneliness and anx-
iety of those left to their own devices on the other.
According to Fromm, these dynamics occur not only in
authoritarian regimes, but also in capitalist democracies, where
vast swaths of people become "automatons."9 6 In contemporary
democracies, human beings are faced with an alternative: "either
to escape from the burden of freedom into new dependencies
and submission, or to advance to the full realization of positive
freedom which is based upon the uniqueness and individuality of
man."9 7 Positive freedom "consists in the spontaneous activity of
the total, integrated personality."98 In this freedom, the individ-
90. Id.
91. Id. at 150.
92. Id. at 205-08.
93. Id. at 3-4, 205-39.
94. Id. at 222-25.
95. Id. at 231; cf. id. at 267 (looking at two different perspectives of indi-
vidual freedom).
96. Id. at 240.
97. Id. at x.
98. FROMM, supra note 89, at 84.
2007]
36 NOTRE DAME JOURNAL OF LAW, ETHICS & PUBLIC POLICY [Vol. 21
ual retains her individuality, but overcomes the isolation of nega-
tive freedom by spontaneously loving and being in solidarity with
others.99
If Fromm was right, John Paul II stands on solid ground by
claiming that decoupling freedom from the truth about the
human person creates fertile soil for totalitarianism. Fromm,
like the former Pontiff, maintains that all authoritarian philoso-
phies are "essentially relativistic and nihilistic." 0 They are
rooted in "extreme desperation, in the complete lack of faith"
and ultimately lead to the "denial of life." 10 ' In other words, they
deny the truth about the human person. Although he resists talk
of an immutable human nature, Fromm states that human
nature should not be seen as "infinitely malleable" and that psy-
chology must discover the "inherent laws and mechanisms" of
the human person.10 2 While he eschews any metaphysical bases
for determining the truth about human persons, he argues that
empirical observation can reveal to us what promotes or deni-
grates life. Accordingly, we know that states such as poverty, iso-
lation and powerlessness are "directed against life," while those
things that foster freedom, spontaneity, relationality, creative and
critical thinking and certain emotional and sensuous experiences
are good for human life.' Frustration of these human potenti-
alities generates "destructive and symbiotic impulses."10 4 While
Fromm accentuates the "realization of the self' more than John
Paul II, like the Pope he ultimately sees "active participation" in
the creation of the social good as the remedy to the alienation,
anxiety, and despair that give rise to the modern tendency to
escape from freedom.'0 5 Fromm also mentions that examination
of the history of humanity reveals that the pursuit of truth and
justice are inherent in human nature and has served as "the most
important weapon" of the oppressed in their struggle for "free-
dom and growth."10 6 Ultimately, Fromm claims that if humans
do not listen attentively to the knowledge and insight we have
99. Id. at 257-59; cf. id. at 267 (discussing the sacrifice man makes inte-
grating with society while still maintaining his individuality). The distinction
between positive and negative freedom is at the heart of Fromm's inquiry, as
evidenced by his introductory query, "Is freedom only the absence of external
pressure or is it the presence of something-and if so, what?" Id. at 4.
100. Id. at 171.
101. Id. See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, at para. 70.
102. FROMM, supra note 89, at 13. Fromm also argues that relativism
stifles "original thinking." Id. at 247.
103. Id. at 265; cf id. at 267.
104. Id. at 286-87.
105. Id. at 274.
106. Id. at 286.
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about our humanity and accept the challenge and the gift of our
freedom, the gains of democracies will vanish and societies will
revert to authoritarianism to overcome the loneliness, anxiety,
and despair of contemporary life.
10 7
In addition to Fromm's analysis, the history of genocides
attests to the importance ofJohn Paul's insistence that the truth
about the human person must be acknowledged. The planners
of these genocides convinced ordinary people to become perpe-
trators by denying the humanity of the victims. For example, the
Germans depicted Jews as "rats" and the Poles as "pigs."10 8 The
Khmer Rouge slaughtered 2,000,000 Cambodians in accordance
with their maxim, "to keep you is no gain; to kill you is no
loss. ' O9 The Rwandan genocidaires, mainly ethnic Hutus,
referred to the Tutsis as "cockroaches" in their massive propa-
ganda campaign."a Going further back, one can read the chron-
icles of Cristobal Col6n and Amerigo Vespucci to see how their
depictions of Native Americans as savages set the stage for their
annihilation at the hands of European settlers. Repressive laws
that denied the full humanity of the Native Americans persisted
well into the 1970s in the United States. Some of the laws con-
tinue to exist. 11 The same can obviously be said of the African
peoples brought to the "New World" as slaves, who legally
counted as three-fifths human and were not accorded the right
to participation until relatively recently. In other words, when
the basic anthropological truth about the equal worth and dig-
nity of every human person is eclipsed, the exercise of "freedom"
can easily degenerate into "unfreedom." Only a "slave" shackled
107. Id. at 295-96.
108. For examples of this and other German anti-Semitic material, see
German Propaganda Archive, Nazi Propaganda: 1933-1945, http://www.calvin.
edu/academic/cas/gpa/ww2era.htm. Calvin College has created an online
archive of German propaganda to help people understand totalitarianism. Of
particular interest are the discussion and links pertaining to the film Der Ewige
Jude [The Eternal Jew], which was said to have an impact on Hitler's decision to
launch his "final solution." See German Propaganda Archive, A Nazi Review of
"The Eternal Jew," http://www.calvin.edu/academic/cas/gpa/ewig.htm.
109. SAMANTHA POWER, A PROBLEM FROM HELL: AMERICA AND THE AGE OF
GENOCIDE 119, 143 (2002).
110. Id. at 330.
111. Professor Michelle Grijalva brought this home vividly in her paper
entitled The Dawn of a Renaissance? The Image of the "Noble Savage" and its
Impact on American Indian Education and Religion (July 30, 2006) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with author), which she delivered at the Oxford
Round Table. Professor Richard Shiels described the discriminatory laws in his
paper entitled Native American Religious Freedom in the United States (Aug.
2, 2007) (unpublished manuscript, on file with author). I am grateful to both
for their insights.
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by his perverted passions and utter ignorance would kill another
human being because of his ethnicity, skin color, religion, politi-
cal beliefs, or sexual orientation. The brutalization of human
beings is not an act of a free person, but one blinded to the truth
about the human person and imprisoned in avarice, nihilistic
despair, and self-deception.1 12 While the disfigured "truth" of
imperialists and supremacists is dangerous to oppressed peoples,
only by insisting on the truth of their humanity can we condemn
their desecration and conquest.
Succinctly stated, relativism, or the belief that there are no
moral absolutes, opens the door to grave human evils, such as
genocide, torture, rape, political oppression, discrimination,
exploitation, and the annihilation of one's ideological oppo-
nents. 13 As former National Security Adviser Zbigniew Brzezin-
ski argues, the century of "megadeath," which claimed the lives
of more than 167,000,000 people in the name of political ideolo-
gies, was possible because of the predominance of a radical
moral relativism that denied the absolute value of the human
person." 4 Brzezinski traces the development of twentieth cen-
tury "metamyths," which undergirded totalitarianisms, to trends
in the nineteenth century. He writes:
[T]he assault on religion produced also the rejection of
moral norms as limits on political action. As a result, the
nineteenth century saw the essentially aristocratic concept
of personal moral responsibility for political conduct grad-
ually supplanted by the supremacy of moral relativism in
political demagogy designed to activate the masses.
1 15
In this connection, Brzezinski also underscores the extraordinary
skill of dictators like Hitler and Lenin at "depersonalizing the
enemy."
116
112. Cf JOZEF TISCHNER, SPOR 0 ISTNIENIE CZLOWIEKA 298 (1998).
According to Tischner, freedom is by nature "dramatic" or "dialogical." He
opposes the "monological" notion of freedom held by certain strands of liber-
alism. For example, he states, "[t]he problem of freedom is: respond or not to
respond to the question asked of me, to undertake or not to undertake the
challenge posed to me, to share bread or not to share it, to kill or not to kill."
See also TISCHNER, NIESZCZESNY DAR WOLNOSCI, supra note 1, at 11;JOZEF TISCH-
NER, KSIADZ NA MANOWCACH 208 (1999). For an overview of Tischner's philoso-
phy of freedom, see Gerald J. Beyer, Fr. Jdzef Tischner (1931-2000): Chaplain of
Solidarnosc and Philosopher of Hope, 21 RELIGION IN EASTERN EUROPE 17 (2001).
113. Cf VERITATIS SPLENDOR, Supra note 67, at para. 99.
114. ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, OUT OF CONTROL: GLOBAL TURMOIL ON THE
EVE OF THE TwENT-FIRsT CENTURY 17 (1993).
115. Id. at 29.
116. Id. at 30.
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The passing of Fascism and Communism, however, has not
brought an end to this problem. Rather, we now live in what
Brzezinski calls a "permissive cornucopia," a society in which "the
progressive decline in the centrality of moral criteria is matched
by heightened preoccupation with material and sensual self-grati-
fication. '""' This "anything goes" outlook is creating a "global
crisis of the spirit " "as and has the potential to engender violent
frustration among the "have-nots" towards the "haves" of our
globalized world. The promise of "salvation" through material
goods cannot be realized for large tracts of the world's impover-
ished, who therefore are likely to be "manipulated by demagogic
extremists."1 ' More immediately, we have witnessed the atroci-
ties of Abu Ghraib and "Gitmo," symptoms of today's virulent
moral relativism. The justification of torture relies on conse-
quentialist reasoning, which focuses on the potential benefits of
the act, such as obtaining information that might thwart future
terrorist plots and save thousands of lives. 2 It is certain that
contemplating the consequences of one's actions properly
belongs to the moral life of every person. However, consequen-
tialist reasoning overlooks the fact that some acts are inherently
and always wrong, regardless of their potentially beneficial out-
comes. Torture, like genocide, denies the humanity of the vic-
tim.' 21 It fails to acknowledge the moral absolute that prohibits
the violation of the dignity of the human person for any reason
whatsoever. It does not accept the anthropological truth that all
people, regardless of race, nationality, creed, or social status pos-
sess inviolable dignity, the capacity for freedom realized in soli-
darity, and the calling to participation. This includes criminals
and "unjust aggressors," as the Pope maintained in Evangelium
Vitae.122 For this reason, John Paul II named torture among
those acts that are intrinsically evil, i.e., under no circumstances
117. Id. at 65.
118. Id. at 54.
119. Id. In a similar vein, William Greider argues that the patterns of eco-
nomic development and inequality today mirror those that gave rise to Fascism.
See WILUAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT: THE MANIc LOGIC OF GLOBAL
CAPITALISM (1997).
120. Many, including SenatorJohn McCain, a survivor of torture, claim it
is ineffective. John McCain, Torture's Terrible Toll, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 21, 2005, at
34.
121. See ELAINE ScARRY, THE BODY IN PAIN: THE MAKING AND UNMAKING OF
THE WORLD 27-28 (1985) (characterizing torture as "objectification" of the vic-
tim). For an account of the dehumanizing torture tactics used in Abu Ghraib
and other American prisons, see Mark Danner, Torture and Truth, N.Y. REv.
BOOKs, Jun. 10, 2004, at 46; Mark Danner, The Logic of Torture, N.Y. REv. BOOKS,
Jun. 24, 2004, at 70.
122. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, at para. 57.
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justifiable. 12 The same distortion of the truth about the human
person lies at the root of the massive exploitation of the world's
poor. Seen as "expendable," many of them slave away in facto-
ries with sub-human conditions, while the corporations they work
for enjoy generous profit margins.1 24 According toJohn Paul II,
this type of dehumanizing treatment of workers is also intrinsi-
cally evil.1 25 In addition, it is an "abuse of freedom." The "abuse
of freedom" by people who are never satiated by what they have
leads to the denials of the freedom of those who lack basic
necessities and to conditions of ever greater "misery and
destitution." t2 6
Thus, for the reasons articulated herein, stressing the rela-
tionship between freedom and truth is both timely and neces-
sary. Absent the recognition of basic anthropological truths,
"things fall apart."127 John Paul II's critics in Poland and else-
where have underestimated the enduring value of this aspect of
his teaching, perhaps mistakenly believing that nefarious assaults
against human dignity like Auschwitz and Kolyma belong to the
past.128 Even if, however, all people concur with the basic
anthropological truths described above, moving to the realm of
civil laws designed to protect them raises important juridical
questions. Beyond obviously illicit assaults against human dignity
like genocide, ethnic cleansing, rape, slavery, and torture, what
other behaviors or practices so egregiously affront human dignity
that the law must forbid them? When does the state have an obli-
gation not to tolerate the behavior of "sinners"? In other words,
where should societies, in particular, legislators, draw the line
between recognizing moral absolutes rooted in the truth about
the human person and the ability to live one's life as one sees fit?
To move towards greater clarity regarding this issue, this Article
will now turn to the Catholic tradition's concept of public order.
While the concept of "public order" is not free of problems, it
may serve its function well when kept in tandem with the injunc-
tion to see freedom in relation to truth.
As was mentioned earlier, some of the most salient exposi-
tors of the Christian tradition have denied the possibility of
123. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 67, at para. 80.
124. See GREIDER, supra note 119, at 333-59 (discussing the severity and
extent of worker exploitation in today's global economy).
125. VERITATIS SPLENDOR, supra note 67, at para. 80.
126. REDEMPTOR HOMINIS, supra note 72, at para. 16.
127. The reference is to Chiuna Achebe's well-known novel by the same
name, CHINUA ACHEBE, THINGS FALL APART (1967).
128. For examples of American critiques ofJohn Paul II on this issue, see
CuRRAN, supra note 64, at 241-43; Griffin, supra note 65, at 256-60.
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inscribing the whole of its moral teaching in civil law. Thomas
Aquinas, for example, argues that human law (i.e. civil law) is not
obliged to "repress all vices," nor must it enjoin all possible virtu-
ous acts. 129 He states that human law must proscribe only the
'more grievous vices," which most people can avoid. 1 0 The lit-
mus test for Aquinas resides in whether or not the action has any
effect on the common good. Civil law should prohibit only those
acts that injure others and preclude the functioning of society.
For Aquinas, murder and theft are examples of such acts.
131
Likewise, civil law should only prescribe acts of virtue that are
necessary for the preservation of the common good. Civil law
should not mandate acts that are morally praiseworthy but only
contribute to one's "private good.'
32
Importantly, Aquinas argues that a society which prohibited
every immoral act "would break out into yet greater evils."
1 33
Because the majority of people in a society are "imperfect," they
will not be able to bear the strict demands of the moral law,
which only the few virtuous can master.1 3 1 If this imperfect
majority is forced to abide by laws they cannot possibly keep,
their contempt for those laws will cause them to commit even
greater evils, according to Aquinas.' 35 Elsewhere, Aquinas main-
tains that just as God allows some evils to exist in the universe,
government should "tolerate certain evils, lest certain goods be
lost, or greater evils be incurred.' 3 6 Accordingly, Jews and mem-
bers of other faith traditions should be able to practice their ritu-
als, as good may arise from them. To bolster his argument
concerning the avoidance of greater evils, Aquinas cites Augus-
tine's toleration of harlots because banning them will incite even
more potent lust throughout society.
137
Thus Aquinas, one of the most important figures of Catholic
moral theology, clearly did not espouse the "error has no rights"
doctrine. In many ways, Aquinas presented the seeds of the con-
cept of public order that Vatican II adopted centuries later. The
American JesuitJohn Courtney Murray developed this idea in his
129. THOMAS AQUiNAS, SUMMA THEOLOGICA Pt. I-II, Q. 96, Art. 2-3
(English Dominican Fathers trans., Benziger Brothers 1947).
130. Id. at Pt. I-II, Q. 96, Art. 2.
131. Id.
132. Id. at Pt. I-I, Q. 96, Art. 3.
133. Id. at Pt. I-Il, Q. 96, Art. 2.
134. Id.
135. Id. As shall be discussed below, John Paul II agrees with this stipula-
tion, explicitly citing Aquinas. See EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, at para. 71.
136. AQUINAS, supra note 129, at Pt. 11-111, Q. 10, Art. 11.
137. Id.
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writings on religious freedom prior to Vatican II. l"' It was taken
up in Vatican II's Declaration on Religious Freedom, which Mur-
ray helped draft.' 3 9 The idea is predicated upon the distinction
between society and the state, with the former being responsible
for the whole of the common good and the latter responsible for
the narrower public order. According to the Declaration, in
order for the state to maintain the public order, it must provide
for three things: the safeguarding of the rights due to all citizens
in accordance with justice, public peace, and public morality.1 4 °
This triadic concept delineates the sphere in which govern-
ment should properly intervene in human affairs. Although it
attempts to differentiate between governmental and non-govern-
mental responsibilities, it is not specific enough to overcome the
myriad possible impasses regarding the nexus between morality
and civil law."' Because of its ambiguous nature, it is open to
different interpretations, which in turn generate varying applica-
tions. For example, what constitutes "public morality?" What are
its sources? For his part, Murray maintained that public morality
is "determined by moral standards commonly accepted among
the people." '1 42 What shall we say, therefore, of those standards
adopted by, or at the very least tacitly accepted by, the majority of
the German people during the Third Reich? Did the Third
Reich not promote a kind of public peace and public morality, as
it understood them? As Leslie Griffin has observedJohn Paul II,
then Cardinal Karol Wojtyla, rejected the notion of public order
at the Second Vatican Council precisely because the Communist
regime in Poland used this notion to suppress dissidents.' 4 3 In
fact, some members of the Polish episcopate appealed to "public
order" (lad spoleczny) and "public peace" (pok6j spoleczny) to argue
that Solidarity was harming Polish society through labor strikes
(something thatJohn Paul II himself never maintained).144 Seen
138. See, e.g., John Courtney Murray, The Problem of Religious Freedom, 25
THEOLOGICAL STUD. 503 (1964) [hereinafter Murray, Religious Freedom].
139. SECOND VATICAN COUNCIL, DIGNITATIs HUMANAE: DECLARATION ON
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (1965) [hereinafter DIGNITATIS HUMANAE]. For Murray's
elaboration of the concept of public order, see Murray, Religious Freedom, supra
note 138, at 520-21. On his role in developing DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, see CUR-
RAN, supra note 64, at 224-34. See also Griffin, supra note 65, at 245-54.
140. DIGNITATIS HUMANAE, supra note 139, at para. 7.
141. Cf Griffin, supra note 65, at 254, 258. Griffin cites Judge John T.
Noonan, one of the foremost American writers on the relationship between
religion and civil law. Noonan deems the concept "vague." Id. at 261.
142. Murray, Religious Freedom, supra note 138, at 521.
143. Griffin, supra note 65, at 258.
144. See TIMOTHY GARTON ASH, THE POLISH REVOLUTION: SOLIDARITY
280-81 (3d ed. 2002) (maintaining that at the dawn of martial law in Poland in
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in this light, it should come as no surprise that John Paul II did
not accept the concept of public order at Vatican II and did not
utilize it in his papal teaching. 145 Even though it presupposes
limited state powers, by itself public order does not have enough
substantive content to protect against the tyrannical vicissitudes
of the totalitarian state. Its "thin" conception of the human per-
son does not provide enough "anthropological data," or truth
about the human person, to ward off encroachments on the dig-
nity of the individual in the name of some "greater good." Public
order alone does not have the explanatory power to prevent the
horrors of Auschwitz, Kolyma, Rwanda, Darfur, and Abu Ghraib.
It may appear at first glance that public order's requirement that
the state safeguard the rights of all suffices to deny the ability of
totalitarian regimes to obliterate the individual. However, as
Maritain and others have argued, how human rights are inter-
preted depends largely on the underlying conception of the
human person. After all, Marxist, liberal and Christian under-
standings of human rights and how they should be procured dif-
fer greatly in accordance with the various anthropologies at work
in each school of thought.'46 Thus, even if the concept of public
order is utilized, the discussion returns full circle, back to consid-
erations of the "truth" about the human person.
In addition to the abuse of the notion of public order by
authoritarian regimes, John Paul II may not have accepted the
concept of public order because it does not definitively rule out
laws permitting morally illicit behaviors such as abortion.' 47 One
could argue, of course, against the legality of abortion according
to the first criterion of public order, appealing to the inviolability
of the rights of the unborn. However, one might also contend
that public peace and public morality demand that abortion be
permitted in a society. For example, in a society where there is
an overriding social consensus in favor of abortion, one might
argue that public morality commends the practice. Or, one
might argue that the consequences of outlawing abortion would
be so grave and divisive in a given society that it must remain
1981, many of the Solidarity leaders felt abandoned by Archbishop Glemp, the
Primate of Poland). Although Glemp was criticized for being too conciliatory
toward the regime and not unequivocally endorsing Solidarity, particularly its
method of Solidarity strikes, the Catholic Church did play a positive role in the
Solidarity movement. See GEORGE WEIGEL, THE FINAL REVOLUTION: THE RESIS-
TANCE OF THE CHURCH AND THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM (1992).
145. CURRAN, supra note 64, at 240-41.
146. SeeJACQUES MARJTAIN, MAN AND THE STATE (1951).
147. Curran posits this as one of the possible reasons whyJohn Paul II did
not use the category of public order. See CURRAN, supra note 64, at 241-43.
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legal, at least temporarily, for the sake of "public peace. ' 148 John
Paul II went as far as acknowledging this latter possibility in
Evangelium Vitae, his most developed teaching on abortion.'49
While his opposition to a law permitting abortion under any cir-
cumstances was unequivocal in the Polish debate, his position is
more nuanced in this later encyclical. In no uncertain terms the
Pope argued that there is no "right" to abortion, just as rights to
any other intrinsically evil act do not exist.150 A putative right to
abortion cannot be justified by appealing to respect for one's
conscience or freedom; it is rather an "abuse" and perversion of
conscience and freedom. 51 If the best a legislature can do to
limit the evil of abortion is to create a more restrictive law, rather
than a ban, this lesser of two evils can be tolerated.'5 2 This in no
way denies the morally evil nature of the act of abortion. 53 Cit-
ing Aquinas, the Pope admits that moral law and civil law are not
coextensive.' 54 However, any law that contradicts natural law is
an unjust law. Any law that permits abortion is an unjust law, as it
stands in contradiction with the most fundamental right flowing
from natural law, namely, the right to life.1 55 Supporting a law
that attempts to limit the evil of abortion, when the ability to
outlaw abortion entirely does not exist, is not an act of complicity
in that unjust law, however. It is rather an attempt to mitigate
"its evil aspects."1 56 For John Paul II, it is of the utmost impor-
tance that abortion be recognized as a fundamental violation of
the dignity of the human person. Thus, the legislator who finds
herself or himself in this position may support "the lesser evil"
only if she or he makes this recognition known publicly. 57 To
reiterate what was said earlier, to grant that abortion can be a
right, or an act of freedom, is to contend that respect for the
dignity of every human person is contingent, when it is clearly
not negotiable. If such moral relativism gains a foothold, "things
fall apart." Evil must be named evil, even when one is forced to
tolerate it in order to mitigate it.
148. For a fuller exposition of a similar position, see Gregory A. Kal-
scheur, American Catholics and the State, AM., Aug. 2, 2004, at 15 (applying Mur-
ray's theory to the contemporary American debate concerning Catholic
politicians and abortion laws).
149. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, at para. 70.
150. See id. at para. 62.
151. EVANGELIUM VITAE, supra note 45, at para. 71.
152. Id. at para. 73.
153. See id. at paras. 68-71.
154. Id.
155. Id. at para. 72.
156. Id. at para. 73.
157. Id.
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Adjudicating whether or not public order necessitates civil
laws banning, restricting, or permitting abortion ultimately
exceeds the scope of this article. Others have taken up that
debate vigorously elsewhere. 58 For purposes of this analysis, it
suffices to recognize that "public order" does not settle many
controversial questions regarding the relationship between
morality and civil law. This Article contends that public order,
despite its weaknesses, can still be a useful concept for discussing
the relationship between morality and civil law. Public order may
not provide ready answers to a number of moral/legal dilemmas.
However, it can at least help "set the right terms for rational
debate." '59 To return to the earlier described discussion of free-
dom, truth, and liberal democracy in contemporary Poland,
many of the Pope's critics contended, or at least implied, that
John Paul II demanded that all of the Church's moral teaching
be translated into civil law. If John Paul had taken recourse to
the concept of public order, he would have showed this to be
false. Public order reveals that legislating morality is neither
desirable nor necessary. For example, would public order
demand a law banning artificial contraception? By applying the
three norms of public order, it would seem that the answer is
negative. Such a law would hardly seem to protect the rights of
all citizens. Second, such a law does not seem necessary for the
safeguarding of public peace. Finally, preserving the public
morality, at least in Poland and in places like the United States,
would not entail outlawing artificial contraception. In both soci-
eties, the majority of citizens condone its use. This says nothing,
of course, about whether artificial contraception is objectively
wrong. The conclusion that artificial contraception should be
legal is reached because it meets all three criteria of public order.
The issue becomes more nebulous when a particular practice
meets some, but not all of the criteria of public order. Its appli-
cation also becomes more ensnared in controversy and debate
when application of the criteria depends on how one interprets
either the criterion itself or the object to which it applies, such as
in the case of the unborn. Here, the conclusion about the
demands of the public order will depend on whether one con-
158. See CURRAN, supra note 64, at 238-41 (referring to arguments for and
against legalized abortion that appeal to public order). For the record, the
appeal to public order to justify abortion seems dubious, particularly if one
accepts that the unborn is a human being. However, the issue is debatable
within the framework of public order.
159. Murray used this phrase regarding the usefulness of just war theory
for public debate concerning warfare. John Courtney Murray, Remarks on the
Moral Problem of War, 20 THEOLOGICAL STUD. 40, 56 (1959).
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ceives of the fetus as a human being imbued with inviolable dig-
nity and rights. If one accepts this premise, abortion violates
public order's first criterion, the protection of the rights of all. If
not, application of the other two criteria might produce a differ-
ent verdict in a given social and political context.
To repeat, the concept of public order is not a panacea. It
does, however, seem to preclude the possibility of reverting to
"error has no rights" and talk of making Catholic moral teaching
coextensive with the law. It can, at least to some degree, delimit
the sphere within which people can legitimately debate how
behaviors, moral principles, and norms relate to civil law. In the
case of Poland, recourse to this category may have dispelled ques-
tions about the legality of less serious ethical infractions of a pri-
vate nature, freeing public discourse about serious issues such as
abortion from undue bias and fears. In other words, adding it to
the important claim that freedom should be seen in relation to
truth about the human person would dissuade critics of John
Paul II in Poland, and elsewhere, from raising cries of "theoc-
racy." Debating the legality of abortion in Poland within the
framework of public order would have unambiguously revealed
that the Church does not seek to legislate all of its moral doc-
trines."6 By acknowledging that the government should only
legislate on moral issues that concern the public order, the
Church would embrace, as it did in Dignitatis Humanae, liberal
democracy's aim of as much freedom as possible and as much
constraint as necessary.161 It would demonstrate that certain
moral issues, albeit of significance to the Church, fall beyond the
purview of the constitutional state. Other moral issues are of
such gravity that the state must attempt to chart a legal course for
the protection of individuals and the social good.
CONCLUSION: THE CATHOLIC "BOTH/AND"
Perhaps this article has attempted to do the impossible, con-
joining what many commentators have set apart, namely John
Paul II's perspective on freedom and truth and the concept of
public order. In this sense, however, the argument reflects a
broader tendency of Catholic social thought, which Charles Cur-
ran has described as the "both/and" of the Roman Catholic tra-
160. In the United States, Cardinal Bernardin took this approach, per-
haps in an effort to more carefully differentiate between moral issues that
should be of concern to civil law and those that should not. SeeJoseph Cardinal
Bernardin, Address: Consistent Ethic of Life Conference (Oct. 4, 1986), in CON-
SISTENT ETHIC OF LIFE 87-95 (Thomas G. Fuechtmann ed.,1988).
161. See DIGNrrATIS HuMANAE, supra note 139, at para. 7.
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dition. He refers to the "all-embracing universality [of the
Catholic tradition] that is wary of 'either-or' approaches."'6 2 He
specifically suggests that Catholicism accepts the positive aspects
of political liberalism and seeks to build on them. 6 3 In likewise
fashion, this article has defended the value of John Paul II's
teaching on freedom and its relationship to truth and has under-
scored the value of the concept of public order. This article has
argued that use of the category of public order does not obviate
the Pope's claim that democracies must acknowledge the rela-
tionship between freedom and truth. The two concepts can com-
pliment one another. They can mutually reinforce and limit the
scope and nature of the claims that flow from each one. Empha-
sis on the truth about the human person-that she is imbued
with inviolable dignity, given the capacity to realize freedom in
solidarity and solidarity in freedom, and entrusted with the right
and duty of participation-provides indispensable substantive
content to the somewhat vacuous notion of public order. It spec-
ifies, at least to a greater degree, what is due to each person in
justice. Underscoring these basic truths about the human person
precludes the kind of abuse of "public order" by authoritarian
governments that John Paul II astutely perceived. It also disal-
lows a minimalist, individualistic interpretation of the demands
of public order, which would justify forms of "limited" govern-
ment that allow the poor and marginalized to persist in their suf-
fering.' 64 John Paul II forcefully argued that the freedom and
dignity of the poor require economic structures that enable their
active participation in the economic, political and cultural life of
society."' In this vein, the Pope revealed that his insistence on
respect for the truth about the human person arises not only out
of his opposition to abortion, as some of his critics imply.
Rather, the Pope also had the fullness of the human person in
162. CuRRAN, supra note 64, at 21.
163. Id. at 155.
164. Curran correctly states that, especially in the American context,
"public order" may be interpreted this way. He therefore calls for amending
public order to include the demands ofjustice and socialjustice. CuRRAN, supra
note 64, at 230. Cf Murray, Religious Freedom, supra note 138, at 521 (curiously
avoiding the issue by stating that public order excluded considerations of the
role of the state regarding the material well being of its citizens).
165. See REDEMPTOR HOMINIS, supra note 72, at para. 16, CENTESIMUS
ANNUS, supra note 72, at paras. 32-33, 39, 41. See also Pope John Paul II,
Address for the Celebration of the World Day for Peace (Jan. 1, 1998), http://
www.vatican.va/holy-father/john-paul-ii/messages/peace/documents/hfjp-
iimes_08121997_xxxi-world-day-for-peace-en.html; John Paul II, Address for
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mind, which includes the truth that freedom, including eco-
nomic freedom, must be realized in solidarity. As mentioned
earlier, it also means that, according to the Pope, human free-
dom can be assailed not only by authoritarian political regimes
and illicit reproductive practices but also by oppressive economic
structures. 1
66
By the same token, supplementing discussions of freedom
and its relationship to truth with the concept of public order may
spare public discourse of unnecessary agonizing over whether
the Catholic Church has revived the "error has no rights" doc-
trine. If an act has no bearing on the vital good of society, as
Aquinas stated and the doctrine of public order maintains, it is of
no concern to civil law. On the other hand, the truth about the
human person (the anthropology described above) must func-
tion in tandem with the notion of public order to avoid the vac-
uum of moral relativism while simultaneously respecting the
rights of individuals. Generally speaking, democracy accepts
"saints and sinners." In this sense, Adam Michnik was right.167
However, when "sinners" violate the fundamental dignity of the
human person, thereby diminishing the common good, their
acts cannot be tolerated in the name of "neutrality." The "neu-
trality" of liberal democracy, is, in the end, an illusion. The
moral relativism that undergirds "neutrality," which some take to
be a sine qua non of liberal democracy, is itself a truth claim.
Moral relativism asserts absolutely that it is a truth that there is
no absolute truth. Moreover, despite whatJohn Rawls and others
have argued, liberal democracy operates with a conception of the
human person and vision of the good."6 Citizens in a liberal
democracy have only to argue therefore about which conception
of the human person is true, not whether an anthropological
vision should inform its laws. As diverse thinkers like Brzezinski,
Fromm, Tischner, and John Paul II have reminded us, this is an
exigent question.
The road to new forms of totalitarianism lurks just around
the corner. Polish citizens and citizens of democracies every-
166. For a fuller explanation of this aspect of the Pope's teaching on free-
dom, see POPE JOHN PAUL II, SOLLICITUDO REI SOcIALIs: FOR THE TWENTIETH
ANNIVERSARY OF Populorum Progressio (1987).
167. See supra text accompanying notes 2-5.
168. For a compelling critique of Rawlsian political liberalism on this
count, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBERALISM AND THE LIMITS OF JUSTICE (1998).
For a critique of the "neutrality" of liberalism in the Polish context, see ZDZIS-
LAW KRASNODEBSKI, DEMOKRACJA PERYFERII 113-54 (2005). In this connection
also, Jeffrey Stout argues that not all adherents of liberal democracy view it as
neutral, or "tradition-less." See JEFFREY STOUT, DEMOCRACY AND TRADITION
(2004).
FREEDOM, TRUTH, AMD LAW
where should not, therefore, fear John Paul II's call to freedom
in truth and in solidarity. Of course, claims to possess the sole
truth about every aspect of human nature with absolute certitude
should be considered with caution. This is particularly the case
regarding anthropological truth claims that do not cohere with
or that apparently contradict the general characterization of
humans as imbued with inviolable dignity, with the capacity for
freedom and solidarity, and with the inclination towards and
duty of participation. 69 Nonetheless, citizens of modern democ-
racies should fear moral relativism in the disguise of "liberal
democracy," which may lead them down a road they would cer-
tainly wish to avoid. As John Paul II argued, democracy has the
potential to be "ethical." It has been and still can be a potent
force for the protection of human rights. The question is
whether democratic citizens will foster ethics or claim that
democracy always grants equal rights to all "saints" and all "sin-
ners." The answer depends on how freedom is understood and
how its relationship to the truth about the human person is con-
strued. In terms of civil law, attending to this issue, while adopt-
ing the notion of public order, seems to be the best way to
ensure as much freedom as possible and as much constraint as
necessary.
169. In a similar way, Aquinas argued that we can ascertain natural law
and its precepts with less certitude as we descend into greater specificity. See
AQUINAS, supra note 129, at Pt. I-II, Q. 96.
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